Inadequate solid waste management leads to contamination of the soil and surface and underground water; the emergence of antibiotic-resistant superbacteria due to the inadequate disposal of medicines in toilets or in household rubbish; and the emission of persistent organic pollutants, such as flame retardants, present in some electrical/electronic equipment. In Brazil, the principles that underpin the National Solid Waste Policy (PNRS) are consistent with those used by developed countries, namely, the polluter-payer and protector-receiver; cooperation among the different spheres of government, the business sector, and other societal segments; and the shared product life-cycle responsibility (Brasil, 2010a; Novi et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2019). In the latter, selective collection and reverse logistics systems are the primary instruments (Zhang et al., 2011). Thus, the general objective of this work is to compare the technical and economic feasibility of four different sectorial agreements for reverse logistics implemented in Brazil. The specific objective is to describe the possible conflicts of interest of the multistakeholders. The sources of evidence used in this multi-case study were interviews, observations, and documentary research in the period from 2016 to 2018. The first result demonstrated that the economic viability of reverse logistics systems are obtained when the wastes have a commercial value after consumption (packaging and consumer electronics) or when industries organize to charge a fee that covers the costs of recycling and transport (lamps and medicines). The second result shows that there are many stakeholders involved in this process: manufacturers and importers, consumers, private waste and recycling companies, and government represented by municipalities, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), and state environmental agencies (OEMAs). Each one has different interests and responsibilities: government has to preserve the environment and comply with international agreements on climate change, thus creating laws that ultimately burden companies and cities; profit-maximizing companies evaluate these rules as additional costs in their operations, whereas cities, in which operations are conducted, have low financial and managerial capacity. The stakeholder map reveals that there are overlapping roles among agents, with some being the same for all chains, and the constructed power and level of interest matrix indicates the importance of the process to be conducted by the state to align economic and social-environmental interests.