In recent years, there is rising attention on the difficult financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). With constant development and improvement in China’s socialist market economy system, SMEs is becoming a pivotal part of China’s national economy. It can be said that the development of SMEs makes a great contribution to China’s national economy development. However, SMEs are facing financing bottlenecks at the same time. This is not only because of the limited financing capabilities of SMEs themselves but also because of the various commercial bank credit policies. It is necessary to solve credit policy problems between SMEs and banks, not only for SMEs but also for the further development of commercial banks. This paper analyses the problems and the reasons of “credit grudging” behavior of China’s commercial banks and SMEs financing difficulties through a critical analysis. This paper also uses the method of the dynamic game theory to probe into credit problems between SMEs and commercial banks under the condition of information asymmetry. At the end of the paper, conclusions are made and suggestions are proposed for a win-win solution concerning credit policy problems between SMEs and commercial banks.