We study a compensation plan problem in the fashion retailing industry, which involves a risk-neutral fashion retailer and a risk-neutral salesperson, in a two-stage game framework with asymmetric information. In the first stage, the fashion retailer provides a menu of compensation plans to the salesperson who decides which plan to sign based on his superior market demand information. Confronted with the asymmetric demand information, the fashion retailer could observe market information from the salesperson's response by designing a menu of compensation plans rather than a single one to the salesperson. In the second stage, the fashion retailer then makes production decision and the salesperson determines his selling effort. We consider both adverse selection and moral hazard. We adopt the quota-based plan to derive the fashion retailer’s optimal compensation plan design and the salesperson's best response. We emphasize the impact of the quota level on the system outcomes. The results reveal that a higher quota level is disadvantageous to the fashion retailer but advantageous to the salespersons.