Abstract
This study develops a non-cooperative, incomplete-information game-theoretic model to analyze the efficacy of United States' policy of strategic ambiguity in Cross-Strait relations under conditions of asymmetric economic interdependence. While classic deterrence theory posits that clear, credible commitments minimize the probability of conflict, our formal model demonstrates how deliberate signaling uncertainty can effectively deter both a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan and military coercion by Beijing. By incorporating cross-strait trade volumes, semiconductor supply chain integration, and sanctions costs as continuous payoff variables, we delineate the dynamic equilibrium thresholds under which strategic ambiguity outstrips strategic clarity in maintaining regional stability. Our quantitative game simulation reveals that strong economic interdependence expands the parameter space wherein strategic ambiguity functions as a stable Nash equilibrium, provided the perceived probability of U.S. military intervention remains within a bounded critical interval [0.42, 0.78]. Conversely, rapidly shifting conventional military balances and deep economic decoupling compress this equilibrium interval, destabilizing dual deterrence and escalating the risk of miscalculation. These findings offer critical policy insights into modern crisis management, highlighting that preserving deterrence in the Asia-Pacific requires continuously calibrating ambiguous security guarantees alongside deep commercial ties and trade integration.
