In order to create a fair and neutral position Rawls disregards the psychological features such as altruism and envy that might influence the establishment of the principle of justice. It is however worth noting that in this process Rawls takes the principle of mutually disinterested principle in original position for granted. RobertNozick as Rawls’s intellectual rival who is among the founders of the libertarian school criticizes Rawls on the ground that Rawls’s initiation not only is not fair and neutral it is not in fact conformant to the human’s nature. Removal of envy from the original position is regarded as indefensible by Nozick because he believes that all features and qualifications of human nature should be considered in a political theory. However, Nozick claims that envy is not completely absent in Rawls’s theory. He believes that the principle of difference introduces envy to Rawls’s theory.This article examinesNozick’s criticisms and analyses his defense of the essentiality of envy in the development of a theory of justice. It also investigates whether Rawls’s theory of justice will itself create the envy. The methodological framework employed in this paper for the examination of the views of Rawls and Nozick is comparison and analysis of the content.