This article presents a mathematical model that integrates two mechanisms of creation ofcompetitive advantages that can lead to the achievement of economic rents: capability-buildingand resource-picking. The article explores a theoretical modeling that makes possible theunderstanding of the interaction between distinct strategic mechanisms and economic value.Through the establishment of a premise linked to asymmetric information, the expected profit andits sensitivity to competitive advantage variablesare obtained, using partial derivatives. The modelpresents a normative contribution for managers, suggesting strategies for the company, throughthe orientation of more efficient choices on the allocation of efforts in the establishment ofcapabilities or in the selection of new resources.The simulation and the analysis of sensitivity ofthe model indicate that capability-building, linkedto the dynamic-capabilities view, propitiatesmarginally increasing profits while resource-picking, associated to the resource-based view, leadsto marginally decreasing profits, implying differentiated strategies of creation of economic rents.Thus, while investments in capability-building canleverage marginal profits of the resources of thecompany, investments in information to improve resource-picking can present a point ofsaturation, depending on the function of the cost related with the reduction of informational noise.