Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of Special Interest Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors

Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of Special Interest Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors

Del, Guercio D.
journal of financial and quantitative analysis 2019 Vol. 54 pp. 1573-1614
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15671
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